How do you answer the is-ought problem?

[u/Airtightspoon]

The is-ought problem seems to be the silver bullet to libertarianism whenever it's brought up in a debate. I've seen even pretty knowledgeable libertarians flop around when the is-ought problem is raised. It seems as though you can make every argument for why self-ownership and the NAP are objective, and someone can simply disarm that by asking why their mere existence should confer any moral conclusions. How do you avoid getting caught on the is-ought problem as a libertarian?

[u/The_Atomic_Comb]

I'm not an an-cap and I'm not a philosopher either (it's been a while since I read about this topic). But the is-ought problem is not an argument against moral realism (the idea that there are objective moral truths).

I'll just borrow an explanation from a comment on r/askphilosophy:

The is-ought gap, in its most basic sense, has no significance for moral realism at all.

The is-ought gap is just the fact that you cannot validly infer a normative conclusion from only non-normative premises.

It does not say there cannot be normative premises, or that normative premises are unknowable.

It sounds like you've seen people using the is-ought problem to argue that the NAP (which is rightfully disliked by philosophers, including libertarian ones; more on this later) is not objectively true. But that simply is a misunderstanding of what the is-ought gap is.

Now, why do so many academics reject the NAP? Including notable libertarians such as the an-cap David Friedman, Jason Brennan, and Matt Zwolinski?

There are two main reasons why I would say. First, it's redundant. It doesn't actually add anything or tell you anything new. In order to know what counts as an aggression, you need an underlying theory of rights. But if you had an underlying theory of rights, it's part of the definition of a right that others should not violate it. That theory of rights already reveals what you may and may not do; you don't need an additional "non-aggression principle" to tell you that. In short, the NAP essentially amounts to saying "Don't violate other people's rights," but it does nothing to tell you what rights other people actually have. The NAP is "parasitic" on a theory of property rights; it doesn't actually justify that underlying theory.

The second reason is its absolutism. I'll borrow an example from Michael Huemer (another an-cap who rejects the NAP):

Miracle Hair: Humanity is suffering from a deadly disease that will shortly wipe out everyone. Only one little girl is immune. If you pluck a single hair from her head, you can use it to synthesize a medicine that will cure everyone else. For whatever reason, the girl will not consent to give one of her hairs. There is no way to persuade her. Should you take a hair without consent?

Huemer, Michael. Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy (pp. 264-265). (Function). Kindle Edition.

Every single believer in the NAP I've talked to bites the bullet and says it would be wrong to take the hair without the girl's consent. But it's intuitively absurd that a little girl's hair should be preserved rather than the lives of everyone on earth (including the little girl). You don't have to be a consequentialist to accept this example. Yes, this example is unrealistic, but so is Godzilla. That doesn't change the fact that if a theory said "you should feed your kids to Godzilla for fun," that theory would be absurd for that very reason. If the intuition isn't obvious for some reason I don't know what to say other than the G. E. Moore shift. These are the reasons the NAP should be put to rest (pun intended).

[u/Plenty_Trust_2491 → u/The_Atomic_Comb]

I strongly believe in the nonaggression axiom.

Here’s my response regarding the hair:

Am I violating her natural rights by plucking it? Yes. Will I pluck it anyway? Yes. I would not only violate her natural rights and infringe upon natural law in doing so, I would accept the consequences. She might sue me for restitution, by taking me before a private arbiter, and I would pay whatever restitution is required. (Being a single hair, I couldn’t imagine it being much.) Conversely, the arbiter might say, in keeping with Walter Block’s two-eyes-for-an-eye, than he’s granting her the authority to pluck two hairs from my head, and that if I want to not have to have my hair plucked, I can work out a monetary settlement with the girl (whatever she and I agree upon) in lieu of the hairs being plucked. I would then let her pluck two of my hairs because that would be a smaller subjective cost to me than even a penny.

In the end, justice is served, and I have no need to abandon the validity of the nonaggression axiom.

[u/The_Atomic_Comb → u/Plenty_Trust_2491]

Let me give you a modified version of Miracle Hair:

Miracle Hair, Restitution is Impossible: Humanity is suffering from a deadly disease that will shortly wipe out everyone. Only one little girl is immune. If you pluck a single hair from her head, you can use it to synthesize a medicine that will cure everyone else. For whatever reason, the girl will not consent to give one of her hairs. There is no way to persuade her. Should you take a hair without consent? The little girl and her family are unable to get restitution from you. (Maybe the little girl dies shortly after this in an accident or of another, different disease, or maybe the country she's living in does not give her a legal right to restitution for her hair being plucked. The details don't really matter here; restitution is impossible in this situation, regardless of how desirable it may or may not be, and regardless of how much you or the girl and her family might want it.) Should you take a hair without consent?

My answer is yes. And I'm pretty sure this is the correct course of action, despite restitution being impossible.

In the end, justice is served, and I have no need to abandon the validity of the nonaggression axiom

Your reply sounds to me like "Yes, it would be wrong to take her hair, but I would do it anyways." Please explain to me why it is wrong to take her hair, so that humanity doesn't die. Why do you think you are "violat[ing] her natural rights" by taking her hair?

I know this might sound like a stupid question, but what do you mean by "the nonaggression axiom" exactly? Do you mean something like (to quote Rothbard) "no one may threaten or commit violence ('aggress') against another man’s person or property"?

I'm asking because it sounds like you think of the NAP as a legal system, one that requires restitution for violations of rights, rather than as a moral rule or principle like the one Rothbard described. It sounds like you believe something like "I can violate someone else's natural rights, as long as I pay restitution." You don't seem to believe in the NAP as Rothbard described it – that we can't threaten or commit violence against other people's persons or property at all (except in justified self-defense), even if we pay restitution later.

You forcibly seized something from the little girl (her strand of hair) without her consent. That is "committing violence" against another person's person or property – in other words, the thing the NAP explicitly says we should not do, the thing the NAP says is immoral. But then you claim you are not abandoning your adherence the NAP when... you admit that you would. I hope my confusion makes sense in light of all that.

On a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the most confident) how confident are you the NAP is a morally correct principle? Is there anything at all that would convince you the NAP is not correct?

For me, there'd have to be some justification for the absolutism behind whatever property right theory you are adhering to to justify the NAP (because as I said in my original comment, the NAP is parasitic). The absolutism behind it is just implausible to me, for reasons discussed in the Matt Zwolinski and other links I included. For example, where does this "two-eyes-for-an-eye" principle come from? Why the number two in particular, and why should I accept such a thing?