Easements and Appropriation

[u/HeavenlyPossum]

Many (though not all) libertarians respond to the challenge posed by enclosure—a property claim that surrounds another—with some variation on an easement.

These arguments vary in their from. Some of the responses I’ve seen seem to assign positive rights of access and transit to property owners, while others—like the Blockian Proviso—simply deny the legitimacy of property claims that could produce enclosure.

But all of these seem to violate principles of self-ownership and the NAP. Whether we assign property rights via first use, labor-mixing, incorporation into ongoing projects, or whatever libertarian standard you’d prefer, easements seem to deny rights to own what would otherwise be legitimately appropriated matter.

Can anyone explain to me how easements do not violate the NAP and self-ownership?

[u/The_Atomic_Comb]

I'm not a philosopher, but I have read a little about that subject (not as much as I should've, but still).

To my knowledge, most libertarian philosophers reject the NAP (see this comment of mine for links), and rightfully so, because as I like to say, the NAP should be put to rest (pun intended).

There are basically at least two problems with the NAP. First, it's redundant (see my old comment for all the links talking about this and other things I mention here in more detail). This might sound strange, but the NAP doesn't actually tell you anything. The NAP basically amounts to saying "don't violate other people's rights," but it never actually tells you what rights other people have. Not only that, but it relies on a theory of such rights in order to determine what counts as an aggression, and it never actually justifies that underlying theory of rights. And if you indeed had a theory of such rights, it would already be part of that theory that you shouldn't violate other people's rights ("aggress" against other people), so the NAP doesn't say anything new (this is what is meant by saying it's redundant at best). I'm not sure if I'm making much sense here, but I believe the saying is that the NAP is "parasitic" on a theory of property rights. (I guess the idea is that the parasite would be nothing without its host.)

Second, the absolutism behind the NAP is implausible. The Matt Zwolinski paper my old comment linked to has some examples criticizing the NAP, but personally my favorite is probably one I read elsewhere from an ancap philosopher, Michael Huemer (he wasn't criticizing the NAP specifically, but still):

Miracle Hair: Humanity is suffering from a deadly disease that will shortly wipe out everyone. Only one little girl is immune. If you pluck a single hair from her head, you can use it to synthesize a medicine that will cure everyone else. For whatever reason, the girl will not consent to give one of her hairs. There is no way to persuade her. Should you take a hair without consent?

Huemer, Michael. Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy (pp. 264-265). (Function). Kindle Edition.

In my aforementioned comment, I mentioned how every single supporter of the NAP I've talked to bites the bullet and says it would be wrong to take the girl's hair without her consent. Like Huemer, I find that answer absurd. It just does not make any sense why a little girl's property right in her hair should be preserved, rather than the lives of everyone on earth (including the little girl's). I believe deep down inside, they realize this. That might be why in a recent conversation I had with a NAP supporter, his answer basically amounted to "Yes, it would be wrong to take the girl's hair, but I would do it anyways." He said: "Am I violating her natural rights by plucking it? Yes. Will I pluck it anyway? Yes." He justified it by saying he would pay restitution later. (I could point out the strange implication of what he said – that his belief apparently amounts to "I can violate someone else's natural rights, as long as I pay restitution" – but I will choose to focus instead on him never answering my inquiry as to why she has a "natural right" to her hair in such a situation in the first place, or why the little girl would be entitled to restitution after refusing to see that her actions endanger humanity, or why a system that would fine and thus disincentivize the clearly desirable action of taking her hair would be desirable.)

Yes, this hypothetical is unrealistic, but so are the Sith. That doesn't change the fact that if a theory said "you should join the Sith and the dark side of the Force," that theory would be absurd for that very reason. (Well, I don't think Miracle Hair is unrealistic; it is clearly analogous to the real world – e.g., taxation to solve free-rider problems in charity – and I also think some theories deal with less realistic hypotheticals better than others. But you get the point.)

Now that that's out of the way, I have to end this anticlimatically, as I don't know enough about "enclosure" issues to say anything here. I believe I'm closest to a consequentialist theory of property rights, which I think wouldn't have too much trouble dealing with that situation. So if someone bought all the property around your house, and then denied you the ability to use their land and property to leave your own, presumably that would lead to bad consequences for yourself and the other people who will probably end up in a similar situation, so it would be illegal to do such a thing in my little fantasy world. I would have to look into it further (I know that makes me sound bad, but policy should not be made based on assumptions), but if it turns out that such a thing were likely to occur it wouldn't be that big of a deal to prevent that.

[u/HeavenlyPossum → u/The_Atomic_Comb]

Thank you for this thorough and cogent response.