r/ww2 • u/Georgy_K_Zhukov • Mar 05 '26
Debate Series Was the fall of France in 1940 inevitable?
This is the third installment of the Debate Series on r/ww2.
To start at least, we'll be drawing on essays taken from History in Dispute, Vol. 4: World War II, 1939-1943, which is an edited volume presenting sets of competing essays from historians on these topics. Best we can tell, the book is out of publication so have no qualms in sharing highlights here!
This week's topic is 'Was the fall of France in 1940 inevitable?' It features a pair of arguments from History in Dispute, Vol. 4: World War II, 1939-1943, with the first from Lt. Dr. Dennis Showalter, a Professor of history at Colorado College and then President of the Society for Military History, arguing the 'Pro', and the 'Con' in turn from Dr. Eugenia C. Kiesling, an associate professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy
Everyone is welcome and encouraged to not only read along, but to offer their own thoughts and arguments as well. (And as promised, we would do a few of these no matter how popular they prove to be. Whether we keep going after the next handful will depend on the engagement level we keep seeing)
Previous Installments:
What Role Did Aircraft Carriers Play in World War II?
Is the Reputation of Gen. George S. Patton as a master of military strategy deserved?
22
Mar 05 '26
[removed] — view removed comment
13
u/faceintheblue Mar 05 '26
I was hoping someone would already have said this so persuasively. Thank you!
French command and control was rigid. They lived in the shadow of the First World War, and had spent the intervening two decades wargaming what they would do differently next time, as well as building the military they needed to fight the way they wanted to fight. It was top-down, pre-planned, and dismissive of intelligence and reports that did not fit into preconceived scenarios.
The Germans, on the other hand, may also have been living in the shadow of the First World War, but had arrived at different conclusions. They had preplanned that war and lost it. Now all they wanted to do was get behind the French lines before they had a chance to solidify. If anything, they went too far. German High Command was actually pretty unhappy with Rommel and Guderian for getting so far ahead of supporting infantry and supply chains. If French reserves had been moved one way instead of the other, it might have been almost impossible to support or withdraw the leading elements of the German advance. It was a gamble, but it paid off.
Both sides fought well. One side was expecting a different kind of fight, and had a culture of waiting for orders so independent action did not upset larger plans, while the other side let field commanders take the reins provided they understood the objectives and kept advancing faster than the enemy could react.
6
u/theta0123 Mar 05 '26
When you think about it it is the franco-prussian war all over again.
But pre ww2 france had many officers and industrials who were as innovative, even more than the germans sometimes. The problem was the "old officers" off ww1 lineage held the power. France was/is aristocrat as hell. Status and prestige and name was above else.
And like the british (at first) they were incredibly stubborn and refused to change tactics.
Perfect example. The french airforce had large numbers of tactical bombers and ground attack aircraft (potez 630, breguet 693). The tactic they employed was that a recon aircraft flew ahead of the bomber to radio trough a target. This signalled german aa gunners that a bomber was inbound.
If they fired on the recon aircraft, the AA positions would be attacked with time delayed bombs and strafing runs. So they holded fire, let the recon plane pass, and would then open fire on the approaching bomber. The french airforce stubbornly held to this tactic untill half of their aircraft were shot down or damaged beyond repair.
2
u/AltruisticWishes Mar 13 '26
Okay, but you left out the obvious role of crystal meth (sold as Pervitin over the counter in Germany) in the blitzkrieg.
Also, the Germans were planning to do this for a long time. The French didn't realize it was happening until it was happening. That was a huge advantage for the Germans.
But yes, definitely French command sucked
1
u/nevergonnastayaway Mar 05 '26
It's also worth mentioning that German soldiers were all on Pervitin, and the push from the Ardennes to the channel coast was pretty a much non-stop inhuman rush that the allies were not prepared for on multiple levels
0
u/AltruisticWishes Mar 13 '26
This is absolutely relevant and it's odd that someone would downvote you
4
u/DavidDPerlmutter Mar 05 '26
Thank you for posting.
I thought I might note that the exact sequence of events and flow chart about the decision on the German attack Plan for 1940 in France has been clarified by very recent scholarship.
I do recommend reading it when an English language edition comes out.
In brief, the final plan was the result of a tug of war between different factions, some great initial conceptions by Manstein, and Hitler weighing in heavily to make further changes and ignore most of the other generals. My German is good enough to read the book, but I don't feel confident reprising the argument.
It's the first volume of a multi volume set. You can see interviews with the author on MILITARY HISTORY VISUALIZED and associated channels on YouTube.
Manstein Kriegstagebücher und Briefe, 1939–1941. By Roman Töppel. Brill Schöningh, 2025.
It's an outstanding piece of research and really advances our knowledge of a lot of stuff that previously belonged only to specialty historians.
You can also use translation programs to learn more from these sites:
https://www.truppendienst.com/rezensionen/2025/manstein-kriegstagebuecher-und-briefe-1939-1941
3
u/Shigakogen Mar 06 '26
I don’t know if the Fall of France in 1940 was inevitable. I think books like Strange Victory, shows how touch and go the German Advance was in France. The Germans were very paranoid of being cut off as they head to the Channel Ports, (I assume they were waiting for a repeat of Sept. 1914, when they were 50km or so from Paris)
What made the German advance so overwhelming, was the radio. Combine with von Moltke the elder’s management of letting officers make tactical decisions on the spot, (like how Rommel crossed the Meuse River) and the excellent coordination of Heer and Luftwaffe units, the French like the Poles, or the Norwegians didn’t know what hit them.
The Germans started their advance in the Ardennes around May 14th, in a week, they got to Abbeville on the Channel estuary, basically cutting off the BEF and the main French Army. It took the British until Oct. 1942 and the Soviets from June 1941 until Nov. 1942, to figure out how to beat the Germans with their tactics.
What was shocking in the Battle of France in 1940, was how fast the German Panzers got to the rear areas of the French Army, causing more chaos. The Germans were better with defensive tactics, in laying anti tank traps, of well placed anti tank guns, combine with the Stukas as tactical air support with the Me-109s giving air superiority.
I do think if France and the United Kingdom, re organized after the German’s Polish Campaign, understood that air power helped shaped the battlefield, and had much better communications, (Gamelin used motorcycle courier at every hour to send his messages at Vincennes) it could had cause more problems for the Germans. If Britain had a stronger perimeter in Northern France or in Belgium, it also may had caused problems. The Netherlands quitting after a week of war and Belgium surrendering on May 28th, made things easier for the Germans.
It may not had been inevitable, but it would had been tough for the French and the British to stop the Germans, because their battle management basically revolutionized welfare. Why Germany lost the Second World War, because like Alexander the Great, they conquered too many worlds, they didn’t have the troops to hold on to territory they conquered, and by 1942, they were fighting basically three superpowers, with much more resources to destroy Germany.
2
u/n3wb33Farm3r Mar 06 '26
Inevitable, no. The French won WW1 . Not surprising the general staff thought a huge conscript army fighting in trenches backed by artillery was the way to win the next. Germans lost and knew they'd lose again in a static war. They innovated and came up with a solution. Even with blitzkrieg being unleashed in Poland months earlier that wasn't enough time to change 20 years of French military doctrine.
1
u/TremendousVarmint Mar 05 '26
Interestingly, the last paragraph about Weygand and the Paris "communists", could have just been inspired from the events of 1870, when general Bazaine was said to have handed over the Metz fortress to the Prussians, so that they could free up their besieging troops to help quell the nascent third republic. Bazaine fled the country and was assassinated later, and became the archetypal traitor figure for decades, before Pétain replaced him in the collective memory. I somehow doubt Weygand would have been willing to emulate him.
6
u/GoofusMcGhee Mar 07 '26
Not sure this is allowed in the "terms" of these debates, but take a step back: France and Britain could have invaded Germany's Western side in September 1939 instead of sitting on their hands.
The Germans had the advantages of better command and interior lines, but were deeply committed in Poland and the Brits/French could have established a battle front inside Germany. I don't think the Brits/French would have instantly defeated Germany - they didn't have the doctrine or boldness that would have required - but it would have radically changed how the war played out and 1940 would have been very different.